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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—oooOooo—
ROBERT D. COLLINS,
Petitioner and Appellant,

Case Nos.

970707-CA
964300201

vs.
Priority No. 15

PATRICIA M. COLLINS,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
—oooOooo—
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(h). Rothe v. Rothe. 787 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah App. 1990), "[i]n an appeal of a
domestic case, we assume that the trial court's findings of fact are correct, and reverse
only if they are clearly erroneous." (Citing Elmer v. Elmer. 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah
1989); Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899
(Utah 1989) ("the same standard of review applies 'whether case is characterized as one
in equity or one in law'")).

1

Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee ("husband") timely filed his notice of appeal
regarding the distribution of property and debt associated with said property.
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant ("wife") filed a notice of cross-appeal regarding
payment of child support and award of attorney's fees to husband. Pursuant to
subsequent Agreement of the parties, the parties resolved their dispute regarding
husband's appeal and the matter was subsequently dismissed. Wife's cross-appeal
remains for decision by the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

THE STIPULATION OF THE CROSS-APPELLANT
FOR ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS FREELY
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED ON THE RECORD.
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF CROSS-APPELLANT'S
ATTORNEY

Standard of Review: When parties enter into stipulation for entry of Decree of
Divorce, the Court of Appeals in reviewing the parties' stipulation must review the
parties' stipulation to determine whether the agreement meets the requirements for valid
binding agreement. The Court must decide whether the parties' agreement was a putative
stipulation or whether the agreement contained mutual assent of the parties for a
valid binding agreement. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987). (See
Record at p. 34, T.T.).
II.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLANT
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

2

Standard of Review: In reviewing an award of attorney fees, the trial court is
given broad discretion whether or not to award attorney fees. In determining the
reasonableness of the amount of requested attorney's fees, there must be some evidence
"'regarding the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the
rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case and the request accomplished, and the
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community.'" Talley v. Talley, 739
P.2d 83,84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); fKerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980);
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Utah Code Ann. §30-33(2) provides, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or
defense."
In an appeal of a domestic case, "the Findings of Fact will be assumed to be
correct, and will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous" Rothe v. Rothe. 787
P.2d 534, 535 (Utah App. 1990). (See wife's Objection to Proposed Decree and
Findings\ husband's Response to Respondent's Objection to Proposed Findings and
Decree and Petitioner's [husband's] Request for Attorney's Fees; Letter of the
Honorable John A. Rokich, dated September 8, 1997; and interlineated Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law received by Judge Rokich, as an enclosure to the Judge's
letter of April 8, 1997 and attached hereto as Exhibit "B" to the Addenda).
3

III.

CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD

Standard of Review: Issues on appeal must be preserved at the trial level or
there must be specific statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in
Trial Court. See LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin, et. aL 805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991),
where the Utah Court of Appeals, in determining Plaintiffs Award of Damages by
Affidavits and Memoranda, the Court held that they would not reach the merits of the
Defendant, [Conlin's] arguments because it [Conlin's Objection to the Award of
Damages to Plaintiff] "was not adequately preserved for appeal by a timely objection
during the trial proceedings. 'It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the Trial Court
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.'" Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); See also Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors.
Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). See also, State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75-80
(Utah App. 1990) (limited exceptions to the general rule include exceptional
circumstances, plain error, and deprivation of liberty interests); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing,
Inc.. 787 P.2d. 525 (Utah App. 1990) and Hill v. Cloward. 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962)).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative case law in this matter includes Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333
(Utah App. 1987), which sets forth the requirements for a binding agreement; Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-3(2) sets forth the discretion of the Trial Court to award costs and attorney

4

fees upon a determination that a party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense;
and Utah Rules of Ci\

v

R-.k- ^2(a) recognizes the authority of the Trial Court to enter

an order and findings, in this case, a Decree of Divorce and I li idii lgs of I '"'act ai id
Coi icl/i isioi i of I a/v - , , • :onsistei it v'itl: i the tei i i: is ai id pi ovisions of the parties' stipulation
read on the record or produced in writing and executed by the parties.
STATEMENT OF CASE
T h e piitlies in (In1, iii.illn itpjieji'ai be lore Mir I i n i i o n i H r Inlm A IsVl- a li in III1
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah for the trial
scheduled regarding the adjudication of Plaintiff s/Appellant's ("husband's") Complaint
for Divorce and Defendant's/Appellee's/Cross-Appellant's ("wife's") Counterclaim At
t h e t i m e set

. ;-..; . •: v\ • .;*

ti •

'

• ^gotiations, the majority oi

discussion occurred between the parties with their respective counsels. With the advice
and assistance of their respective counsels, the parties reached an Agreement resolving all
issues before UR. I ;,.-.. . "ourt and the parties' Agreement was oi ally ei ite it: eel :)! 1 till: :ic tit ial
.

,

-

u n c i i , 1997.

The parties Stipulated Agreement was entered by the parties freely, knowingly
and with the assistance of the parties' respective counsel. The Trial Court required oral
testimony of each of the parties that they had "heard the Stipulation and agreed to all
Ilit* terms mill n iiiiiiililiinHi!11' if'lhr Slipnl.ilinii ,11ini Mm liolli i nm unvd llhi.il! ..i I Iri'iTi; nf
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Divorce could be entered pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Stipulation heard
and entered by the Court." (Record p.34. T.T.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 11, 1997, the parties appeared before the Honorable John A. Rokich for
the adjudication of the husband's Complaint for Divorce and the wife's Counterclaim.
The parties entered into negotiations with their respective counsels for a period of
approximately five (5) hours. During the parties' negotiations, the parties would
periodically request suggestion and preliminary recommendation from the Trial Court, off
the record, in Judge Rokich's chambers, whereby, Judge Rokich attempted to
assist the parties and their respective counsels regarding the disputed issues or
question(s) brought to the judge.1
During the parties' negotiations, the parties entered into full and complete
settlement regarding the divorce issues which were entered on the trial record, by the
parties, with the assistance of the respective parties' counsels. The stipulation for entry
of decree of divorce was entered on two (2) separate occasions with the Trial Court.
The first stipulated agreement of the parties, orally entered on the record in the early
afternoon of June 11, 1997, addressed the husband's payment of alimony to the wife
and the receipt of wife's dependent child disability income in lieu of husband's child
support obligation. The second stipulated agreement of the parties, orally entered on

1

Discussions in chambers with the Judge were videotaped.
6

the record in the late afternoon of June 11, 1997, addressed issues concerning the
distribution of real property between the parties, the payment of the liabilities on said
properties and the payment of the marital debts.
Pursuant to the parties' stipulated agreement for entry of Decree of Divorce,
entcv or about June 24, 1997, proposed Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law for the review and approval to form by wife's attorney.
On or about July 2, 1997, Petitioner received wife's Objection to Proposed Findings
and Decree which requested substantial modification of the Decree and Findings as
pi'oposi (1 h\ I 111J MI lul i iillriiiity.
On or about August 22, 1997, husband filed Petitioner ys Response to
Respondent's Objection to Proposed Findings and Decree and Petitioner's Request for
Attorney 'sfees, along with Affidavit of Wendy J. Lemsfor Attorney fs F\ >es, alleging that
wife's Objection to Proposed Findings and Decree, were for the most part, frivolous and
n
entered by the parties, by and through counsel, on June 11, 1997. In husband's Objection
and Request for Attorney Fees, husband requested an award of attorney's fees in the sum
of $880.33 for having to defend against Respondent's Objection to Proposed Decree and
Findings, which was supported by Affidavit of husband's attorney regarding attorney's
fees
On or about September 9, 1997, husband received the Trial Court's letter dated
September 8, 199 7 by the Honorable John A. Rokich which required husband's counsel
7

to modify the Decree and Findings in accordance with the Court's interlineations. No
request for hearing regarding the wife's Objection was requested by wife or her
counsel. Therefore, the Court's interlineations were made without the benefit of a
hearing on the issue.
Counsel for the husband modified the Decree and Findings in accordance with
the Court's letter and interlineations, and upon no ruling by the Trial Court regarding
husband's request for attorney's fees regarding wife's Objection to Proposed Decree
and Findings, husband's counsel submitted the modified Decree and Findings with a
paragraph addressing husband's pending Request for Attorney's Fees, to wife's counsel
and the Court. (See Decree of Divorce, p.8,^f 26). The Honorable John A. Rokich signed
the submitted Decree and Findings on or about October 29, 1997, which awarded $400.00
to Respondent for defending against wife's Objection to Proposed Decree and Findings.
On or about November 14, 1997, husband filed his Notice of Appeal regarding
the Court's interlineation which required husband to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital
home's second mortgage;2 and the Trial Court's denial of the full amount of attorney's
fees requested by the husband. In response, wife filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on
or about November 26, 1997 addressing the award of the $400 attorney's fees to the

2

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation entered orally on the record, June 11, 1997,
wife was awarded the marital home "subject to any and all liability thereon." The
question raised on husband's appeal addressed whether the parties' subsequent
agreement, also entered orally on the record, June 11, 1997, regarding the parties'
agreement to pay one-half (1/2) each of any marital debts, included the second
mortgage on the marital home.
8

husband and the agreement of the parties to accept wife's dependent child disability
payment in lieu of husband's child support obligation.
1 iftniii iiiiiiihil jiprvenienf h\ (he parties, the parties were able to come to an
agreement regarding the husband's appeal issues and pursuant to Motion to Dismiss

October 27, 1998, b> the Utah Court of Appeals.
•'*LHVLMAJt"I ill> ARGUMENT
The parties, voluntarily, willingly and with the assistance of their respective
counsels, entered into full and complete stipulation for entry of Decree of Divorce at
the time of trial. Wife, with her counsel, made no recorded objection or otU-i
ob j e c t i it :i g t c

ni ("(""' s i i fi n : c 1111 • ni ni I I n •. 1111 s 111111 v 1111 s b . 11111

>n

i 111111 i m 111> i111 n b I in»; t •

dependent disability income wife was receiving directly for the benefit of the parties'
minor child. Even when wife filed an objection to husband's proposed Decree o f
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, wife failed to make any
objeUiim

ni iiiilllii i iiini limn mi) ii " d i d i i i j ' III

I n l i l i i i | i | i n i i ni i n .

The Trial Court did not deny child support to the wife, as and for the minor
child. The wife, pursuant to stipulation, with her attorney, voluntarily agreed on the
record, to substitute husband's child support obligation with wife's dependent child

receh iiig si ich payment

I he wife was not coerced into this agreement by the Trial
9

Court, nor by the husband or husband's attorney. No where in the Trial Court's record
does the wife or the wife's attorney, object to the substitution of husband's child
support obligation. Wife's citation to in-chambers negotiations between the parties in
her cross-appeal is not properly before this Appellate Court, as all such references are
not preserved by trial record for purpose of review.
Notwithstanding, wife's citations to negotiations between the parties and their
respective counsels, wife's attempts to support her after-the-fact claims is an attempt to
withdraw her stipulation, by claiming she was coerced by the Trial Court in accepting
the child support substitution and that she was coerced by the Trial Court in entering
her stipulation on the record at the time of the trial in this matter. Wife was not
coerced in any manner. Wife had ample opportunity to try any issue before the Trial
Court that she may have had disagreement thereon. Wife, however, failed to request
oral argument regarding the issue of the substitution of her dependent child disability
income for husband's child support obligation at the Trial level, and wife entered a
stipulation accepting the substitution. Wife has such, failed to preserve that issue for
decision at the Appellate level.
The award of attorney fees to husband was proper under the circumstances as
husband substantially prevailed over the issues disputed by wife in wife's Objection to
Proposed Decree and Findings whereby wife disputed issues concerning: (1) party
name designations, "Petitioner" rather than Plaintiff, for instance; (2) whether the
10

parties agreement that wife would be awarded three of the four real properties,
including the marital home, subject to any and all liability thereon, including the
marital home's second mortgage; (3) moot issues regarding the exchange of personal
property; and other modifications, additions or substitutions to the parties' agreement
which were not contemplated or agreed-upon by the parties at the time of entry of their
stipulation for Decree of Divorce.3 (See wife's Objection to Proposed Findings and
Decree', See husband's Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Objection to Proposed
Findings and Decree and Petitioner's Request for Attorney's Fees; See letter of Court
[Honorable John A. Rokich] dated September 8, 1997; and Interlineated Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached hereto in Addenda as Exhibit "B").
ARGUMENT

I.

THE STIPULATION OF THE CROSS-APPELLANT
FOR ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS FREELY
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED ON THE RECORD.
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF CROSS-APPELLANT'S
ATTORNEY

Cross-Appellant ("wife") voluntarily, knowingly and with the assistance of
counsel, entered her stipulation orally on the record on June 11, 1997, after at least five
(5) hours of negotiations between the parties and their respective counsels, regarding

3

It is particular to note, that at the time of wife's Objection to Proposed Order
(Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), wife failed to
object to the substitution of her child dependent disability income for husband's child
support obligation. Rather, wife raises that issue for the first time on appeal.
11

the substitution of wife's dependent child disability income in lieu of Appellant's
("husband's") child support obligation during any period of time in which wife received
dependent child disability income. The wife entered her stipulation regarding the
agreement of child support substitution during the first stipulation of the parties entered
on June 11, 1997 during the first part of afternoon).
A subsequent entry of remaining issue concerning real property and payment of
marital debts (second stipulation) was entered by the parties at the second part or late
afternoon hours of June 11, 1997. At no time during the first entered stipulation,
during the second entered stipulation, or during any time between the two stipulations,
did wife give any indication that she did not understand the child support substitution
agreement or that she had not given her consent to that agreement, voluntarily,
willingly and without coercion.
Moreover, even when wife subsequently objected {Objection to Proposed Decree
and Findings, dated July 2, 1997), to the proposed Decree and Findings, submitted by
husband's counsel, wife failed to mention or argue the child support substitution issue
which she now for the first time raises on appeal. Wife has now changed her mind
regarding her voluntary, knowing and assisted by counsel, stipulation and wife now
wants to be allowed to change her mind regarding the child support substitution issue
without any proper reason, justification or exception cited therefor.

12

A.

Cross-Appellant's Stipulated Agreement for Waiver of
Child Support was Properly Entered and Mirrored the
Intent of the Parties

Cross-Appellant's ("wife's") stipulated agreement for waiver of husband's child
support obligation during any period of time in which wife was receiving social security
dependent disability payments on behalf of the minor child, was properly entered
before the Trial Court; was properly accepted by the Trial Court; and mirrored the
intent of the parties to substitute husband's child support obligation with the additional
moneys wife was receiving on behalf of the minor child due to wife's receipt of
dependent child disability income. Utah statute and case law addresses the issue of
substitution of an obligor's child support obligation during any period in which obligor
is receiving dependent child disability income. See Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(8)(b);
Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 962 (Utah App. 1994), holding upon first impression,
that a "trial court may, in its discretion, consider a child's receipt of social security
disability benefits and allow a disabled parent credit for those benefits against the
parent's child support obligation"; and Coulon v. Coulon. 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah App.
1996), allowing offset of obligor's child support payments and receipt of social security
disability payments on behalf of the minor child, but not arrearages.
Thus, both Utah statutory and case law address the issue of offset or waiver of
an obligor's child support obligation and receipt of social security dependent disability
benefits. However, there is no case law addressing whether an obligee's receipt of
13

dependent disability income can substitute for an obligor's child support obligation.
Notwithstanding the lack of statutory and case law on this issue, what is before the
Court is the issue regarding whether wife's stipulation regarding the substitution of
disability income for husband's (obligor's) child support obligation was proper and
whether that issue is properly before this Court.
The intent of the parties in this matter is clear. At the time of trial in this
matter, June 11, 1997, the parties intended to enter into a full and complete stipulation
for entry of Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At the
time of the parties' stipulation, they were both acting voluntarily, willingly,
competently, and with the assistance of their respective counsels. The parties orally
entered their stipulation which included an agreement to have the wife's social security
disability income substitute the husband's child support obligation as long as wife was
receiving that additional income on behalf of the minor child. The Trial Court has the
discretion to enter the stipulation of the parties for entry of Decree of Divorce. As
Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987) held, "[fjor a stipulation to be
binding, agreement by the parties must be evidenced by a signed writing which would
satisfy the Statute of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in Court and on the
record before a Judge."
The Trial Court does not have to accept and approve the stipulation of the parties
regarding spousal or child support. However, in this matter, the Honorable John A.
14

Rokich found that the parties were entering voluntarily, freely and with the assistance of
their respective attorneys, a stipulation for entry of Decree of Divorce. That stipulation
provided for the payment of spousal support to the wife by husband, and the stipulation
allowed the substitution of wife's dependent child disability income for husband's child
support obligation. "A divorce court is not duty bound to carry out the terms agreed upon
by parties in stipulation as to amount that should be paid to wife in lieu of alimony and
the amount to be paid as child support" Madsen v. Madsen. 276 P.2d 917,(1954). See
also, Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975), where husband objected to the entry of a
consent decree on the grounds that he did not know the terms of the decree when he
agreed to it, and that he agreed to it under duress, it was within the discretion of the trial
court to accept or reject the decree, since it was in a position to determine whether the
husband had actually agreed to be bound.
In the instant case, the Trial Court did not have to accept the agreement of the
parties which substituted husband's child support obligation with wife's receipt of social
security dependent disability income on behalf of the minor child. However, the Trial
Court was in a posture to review the entire stipulated agreement of the parties; was able to
discern the parties' intent thereby; and was able to determine the underlying fairness and
appropriateness of the parties' agreement. As such, the Trial Court's Findings and Order
should not be disturbed. "In essence, the law really only enforces the intent of the parties
as to the fundamental agreement between them" Rothe v. Rothe. 787 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah
15

App. 1990). See also, Brown v. Brown. 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987) stating:
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of those involved.
The parties must have completed their negotiations either in person or
through their attorneys acting within the rules of agency. The agreement
then is reduced to writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the
record before the court. This procedure would indicate obvious assent to
the provisions of the agreement so stipulated.
As in Brown, the parties in the matter before the Appellate Court, agreed to the
substitution of husband's child support obligation; the agreement was read into the record
on June 11, 1997; and the agreement was memorialized in writing pursuant to entered
Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 29, 1997.
At no time during the stipulation (first or second stipulation entered on June 11, 1997),
nor at any time in wife's objection to the proposed Decree and Findings, dated July 2,
1997, did wife enter an objection to her stipulated agreement of June 11, 1997, allowing
and agreeing to the substitution of husband's child support obligation. Thus, there is
"obvious assent [of the wife] to the provisions of the agreement so stipulated." Brown at
335.
II.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLANT
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

Under the circumstances of the wife's Objection to Proposed Decree and
Findings, where wife filed a frivolous Objection which for the most part, addressed
issues which were non-material, such as the recently changed party-name designations
from Plaintiff to "Petitioner," for instance, and address issues that were moot, such as a
16

listing of the parties exchange of personal property where the parties had already
exchanged such property, the Trial Court in its discretion, determined that wife's
objection to the proposed Decree and Findings were in part, frivolous, and awarded
husband $400 of the $880.33 requested by husband of his attorney's fees and costs for
having to respond to wife's objection.
The Trial Court has broad discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs where
a party has substantially prevailed on a claim or issue. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2)
provides, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or
defense."
Moreover, wife failed to preserve any type of appellant argument regarding the
award of attorney's fees to the husband where wife failed to file a timely or other
objection to the trial Court's award of the $400.00 attorney's fees to the husband in
response to the wife's frivolous Objection to Proposed Decree of Divorce. At no point
during the time in which the modified Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were resubmitted to the Court, pursuant to the Court's
interlineations, along with Rule 4-504 Notice pursuant to the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration to the wife and wife's attorney, on or about October 27, 1997, did
wife ever object to the award of husband's attorney's fees.
17

Furthermore, wife failed to object to the husband's request for attorney's fees as
submitted in the husband's Response to Petitioner's Objection to Decree and Findings
and Request for Attorney's Fees nor in the husband's Notice to Submit for Decision
regarding Petitioner's Request for Attorney's Fees, submitted on or about September
25, 1997, to wife's attorney and the Court. As the Utah Court of Appeals has held:
'If something occurs which the party thinks is wrong or so prejudicial to
him that he thereafter, cannot have a fair trial, he must make his objection
promptly and seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or by having cautionary
instructions given, if that is deemed adequate, or be held to waive whatever
rights may have existed to do so.' 'Otherwise, it would be manifestly unjust to
permit a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial error had been
committed' and then i f he loses, come forward' claiming error.
Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah App. 1990). See also, (Hill
v. Cloward. 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962)).
III.

CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED
OR PRESERVED BY THE RECORD

Over ninety (90%) of Cross-Appellant's (wife's) brief addresses in chamber
discussions and negotiations between the parties, their respective counsel and the
Honorable John A. Rokich. Wife is referring to matters that were heard off the record
and that are not part of the Trial Court's Record in this matter.4 As such, any and all
such portions of wife's cross-appeal should be dismissed as wife fails to properly refer
to the Trial Court's record. See Onveabor, Id.

4

In chambers discussion with Judge Rokich were videotaped by the Court.
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Notwithstanding wife's failure to properly refer to the Trial Court's record, wife
is for the first time on appeal, raising issues that wife failed to object to whatsoever at
the trial level. Wife stipulated to the substitution of husband's child support obligation
with wife's receipt of social security dependent disability income received on behalf of
the minor child. Wife failed to make a proper objection at the time of the stipulation or
even after the parties' stipulation when wife filed her objection to the proposed Decree
and Findings. Moreover, wife had a full day trial scheduled on June 11, 1997 in which
she could have had ample opportunity to request argument and determination by the
Trial Court regarding husband's child support obligation.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held, where the Court was unable to locate any
reference in the Trial Court's record regarding the Defendant's issue raised on appeal
regarding an award of damages to Plaintiff, the Court stated, "[a]s appellants, the
Conlin's bear the burden of building a trial record adequate to preserve their arguments
on appeal. See Franklin Finn v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
1983) (citing Conlin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991)). As the Court recognized in
LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. et.aL 805 P.2d 189 (Utah Appeal. 1991), "the Conlins
have advanced no argument that any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule
are present here. Consequently, we decline to reach the merits of the Conlin's
argument." Conlin at 197.
Furthermore, not only has wife failed to properly preserve the issue of the
substitution of husband's child support issue properly for appellate review, wife has
failed to properly preserve her objection to the award of $400.00 attorney's fees to the
19

husband as wife failed to file a proper or timely objection to husband's request for
attorney's fees or to the Court's subsequent award of the attorney's fees to the husband,
at the trial level. At no time after husband's request for attorney's fees, Notice to
Submit for Decision regarding husband's request for attorney's fees or even after the
Court awarded husband's attorney's fees pursuant to second modified proposed Decree
of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, did wife ever once raise an
objection to the award of attorney's fees to the husband. Wife again, had ample
opportunity to raise this issue at the trial level and now in an attempt to circumvent
proper procedures, rules and case law, is attempting to raise this issue for the first time
on appeal. As such, wife should be precluded from raising this issue for the first time
on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, wife's stipulation accepting the substitution of her own dependent
child disability payment in lieu of husband's child support obligation during any period
of time in which wife is receiving such disability payment, is not erroneous. Wife
entered the stipulation, freely, voluntarily, and with the advice and assistance of wife's
counsel. Wife cannot now claim that she was coerced in agreeing to the stipulation
which allowed substitution of husband's child support obligation just because wife has
now decided she is unhappy with her own voluntary decision made in June 1997. The
Trial Court did not commit reversible error by accepting wife's stipulation because wife
entered that stipulation of her own accord, with the advice and assistance of her
20

counsel, after five (5) hours of negotiations between the parties and their respective
counsels. Moreover, Wife failed to object, at the trial level, her agreement of child
support substitution. Thus wife is precluded from raising this issue for the first time on
appeal.
Furthermore, wife attempts to put blame for her own voluntary stipulation on the
Trial Court. Wife claims that she was coerced in making the stipulation and that she
could not have argued the child support issue before the Trial Court. The wife is in
error. At the time of the June 11, 1997 stipulation for entry of Decree of Divorce, the
parties gathered before the Trial Court in anticipation of a full day trial regarding the
merits of husband's complaint and wife's counterclaim. At issue by the parties, was
the amount, if any, of husband's child support obligation. Wife had every opportunity
to argue the child support issue before the Trial Court and voluntarily chose not to do
so; wife also had ample opportunity to file or enter an objection regarding the child
support substitution at any time during the June 11, 1997 trial, or thereafter, with the
Trial Court; nor has the wife cited to any exceptions allowing her to appeal an issue
which she agreed upon and failed to properly object to at the trial level. Wife is
therefore, precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal.
Lastly, the award of $400 attorney fees to the husband was proper under the
circumstances. Husband properly submitted the proposed Decree of Divorce and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to wife's attorney for approval to form.
21

Upon receipt thereof, wife's attorney filed an Objection to the Proposed Decree and
Findings, raising frivolous issues such as party-designation terminology and mute issues
concerning exchange of property.5 The Trial Court ruled substantially in husband's
favor regarding wife's objection, and awarded husband less than one-half (1/2) of his
requested attorney fees for having to respond to wife's Objection.
Husband, pursuant to notice and interlineated change and modification by the
Court to the proposed modified Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, resubmitted
the Decree and Findings to the Court for approval, requesting an award of attorney's
fees along with a Notice to Submit regarding attorney's fees to both the Court and
wife's counsel. Again, wife failed to file any objection to the Petitioner's
Request for Attorney's Fees in defending against wife's Objection to Proposed Decree
and Findings and failed to file any type of objection to the second modified proposed
Decree and Findings providing for additional interlineation by the Court for attorney's
fees if appropriate. Again, wife failed to preserve her objection to the award of
attorney's fees properly at the trial level, and as such wife should be precluded from
raising this issue for the first time on appeal.
Therefore, the Trial Court did not commit reversible error by accepting the

5

Wife did address a primary issue previously contested by the parties (pursuant to
husband's Notice of Appeal) regarding whether the award of the marital home to the
wife, subject to any and all liability thereon, excluded the second mortgage; and
whether the parties were required to pay one-half (1/2) each of the second mortgage
pursuant to their agreement to pay one-half (1/2) each of any and all marital debts.
22

wife's stipulation regarding the dependent child substitution of child support in lieu of
husband's child support obligation; and the award of $400 attorney's fees to the
husband was proper under the circumstances. Thus, the Decree of Divorce and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should be affirmed and Appellant (husband)
should be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs for having to defend against
wife's cross-appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7

day of February, 1999.

JL
Wendy J. Lems,
Attomev^or Petitioner/Appellant
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D. Bruce Oliver
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ADDENDUM
A.

Trial Transcript of Parties' Stipulation entered June 11, 1997

B.

Letter dated September 8, 1997 by Judge Rokich, along with interlineated
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

C.

Entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 27, 1997

D.

Entered Decree of Divorce, dated October 27, 1997
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: Robert D. Collins versus Patricia M.
3 i Collins, Case No. 9643 00201.

Counsel, submit your appearance

4 | for the record, please.
5|

MS. LEMS: Wendy Lems on behalf of the plaintiff,

6 I Robert Collins.
7
8
9
10

MR. OLIVER: Bruce Oliver representing Patty
Collins, the defendant, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you been able to resolve any of the
issues and narrow the case down?

11

MS. LEMS: I believe somewhat, if Bruce is agreeing

12

to the stipulation that we made regarding the retirement and

13

so forth (inaudible).

14

go ahead and read that into the record.

15

be entitled to one half of any of the retirement amounts that

16

were accrued during the parties marriage up to the date of

17

their separation, which was January 3 of 1996."

18

done pursuant to a quadro.

19
20
21

Partial stipulation, Your Honor,

I'll

"The defendant will

That will be

THE COURT: Or other such document as required by
the retirement agency.
MS. LEMS: No problem with that, Judge.

The

22

personal property, the defendant has agreed to return any and

23

all personal property that belonged to the plaintiff f s mother

24

or the mother ! s estate.

25

rocking chair, a wash stand, some china, some silverware, a

26

couch, some end tables and other odds and ends.

Those properties consist of a

I do not

4
1

believe that the parties are in dispute of what those items

2

are.

3

Any of the plaintiff's premarital property, any

4

property that he brought in prior to the marriage, the

5

defendant has agreed to return to him.

6

the plaintiff's grandfather's pocket watch, she will return

7

that to him.

8

will be returned to the plaintiff, and any dishes, or odds

9

and ends and pictures of the plaintiff's godfathers will be

10
11

If the defendant has

Also, any of the plaintiff's father's coins

returned to the plaintiff.
Also, evidently, there are three TV's still in the

12

marital home.

13

two TV's that are not working.

14

TV that is the only TV in the marital home that she alleges

15

is working right now.

16

Mr. Collins.

17
18

The defendant has agreed to provide one of the
She evidently has the other

So, one of the three TV's is going to

Also, we have a dispute regarding chain saws.

Have

you agreed to anything on that?

19

MS. COLLINS: (Inaudible).

20

MS. LEMS: Evidently we have no stipulation

21

regarding the return of the chain saws or the miter saw that

22

is at issue here.

23

of tools that Mr. Collins had, those will be returned to him.

24

The camper and the motorcycle, are we arguing that?

So we will be arguing that.

On any type

25

MR. OLIVER: Yes with the furniture division.

26

MS. LEMS: Okay.

And then there is also some home

5
1 | videos of the plaintiff and the minor child that will be
2 I either provided to the plaintiff or copies of those will be
3

provided to him.

4

Then on the issue of the visitation, the defendant

5

had requested supervised visitation.

The parties have agreed

6

that visitation will go unsupervised with the provision that

7

if the plaintiff is assumed to be drinking 24-hours prior to

8

visitation or during any type of visitation with the minor

9

child that a police officer will be called.

That police

10

officer will verify if he has any type of alcohol in his

11

system and if that's the case then visitation will

12

automatically cease --

13
14

THE COURT: And give the blood test or breathalyser,
does he wind up here in the jail, (inaudible)?

15
16

MR. OLIVER: Well, I think certainly if there are
other legal issues that are pertinent thereto --

17

THE COURT: That's what I am saying.

If you call a

18

police officer and he gives him a breathalyser (inaudible)

19

vehicle he is going to wind up here.

20

attention.

21

MR. OLIVER: Yeah.

I just call that to his

I think that would be at the

22

discretion of the police officer to determine whether or not

23

that is a factor, Your Honor.

24

MS. LEMS: And I think what needs to be pointed out

25

is that it needs to be a realistic suspicion of drinking.

26

can't be just because the parties are mad at each other or

It

6
That f s the extent of the

1

something to that effect.

2

stipulation as I know it, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

here?

5

issue?

6

What are going to be the issues

The division of the real estate, is that the big
Alimony?
MS. LEMS: Alimony and also the distribution of the

7

debts, the marital debts and some of the personal property of

8

the parties are at issue.

9

THE COURT: And the division of the real estate?

10

MS. LEMS: Yeah.

11

THE COURT: But they still have, I think, about four

12

units, rental units and so forth?

13

MS. LEMS: Yes.

14
15
16

Three rental units and a marital

home.
THE COURT: Three rentals and a marital home.

And

they have been married for, if I recall --

17

MR. OLIVER: Fifteen years, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Fifteen years.

19

MR. OLIVER: Maybe fourteen years.

20

THE COURT: Now, you got married June 25, 1983?

21

MR. COLLINS: That's correct.

22

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, just one addition to that

23

stipulation and that was that in addition to the stipulation

24

was that in the event that Mr. Collins does anything that

25

would otherwise jeopardize the safety of the minor child,

26

that sanctions on visitation could be imposed and then he

would have to come back to Court.
2 I

THE COURT: Right.

3

MR. OLIVER: So, not just the consumption of

4

alcohol, but other issues.

5

minor child is safe with him.

6

We want to make sure that the

MS. LEMS: And I think that it would be appropriate

7

as well, Your Honor, if we can stipulate to neither party

8

despairing one another in the presence of the minor child.

9

THE COURT: Right.

10
11

MS. LEMS: Any type of divorce proceedings and
whatnot are not discussed in the presence of a minor child.

12

MR. OLIVER: No objection to that, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT: So the child is now what, eight years

14

old?

15

MS. LEMS: Seven, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Seven.

And is there an issue with

17

regards to some contributions made to the acquisition of real

18

property through inheritance?

19

MS. LEMS: Yes, there is.

20

THE COURT: And that was in the amount of $1,500 or

21
22

something like that?
MS. LEMS: We have listed $1,800 and the defendant

23

has stated it about at a little over $1,300.

24

too (inaudible).

25
26

So we are not

THE COURT: But, why can't we divide it?

This has

been a marriage that has been for fifteen years, and of

8
1

course we are going to wind up dividing everything equally --

2

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor --

3

THE COURT:

-- except for if it can be shown that

4

none of the others contributed assets that came from other

5

than the marriage.

6

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I think that we have

7

attempted through negotiations to work something of that

8

fashion out.

9

in earning capacity between the parties.

One of the issues comes down to the disparity
My client is

10

disabled and receiving SSI.

11

THE COURT: Right.

12

MR. OLIVER: And Mr. Collins works for the post

13

I know that.

office (inaudible).

14

THE COURT: Well, he makes about $33,000 and she is

15

getting seven hundred and something plus three hundred for

16

the child.

17

MR. OLIVER: That's correct.

18

THE COURT: So there's a thousand dollars.

19

MR. OLIVER: And so we have been trying to work it

20

out, working in a formula that involves alimony one way or

21

another.

22

formula that would say, "This will work," or "That won't

23

work."

24

been able to.

25
26

And we just have not been able to strike the

So, we have gotten fairly close, but we just haven't

THE COURT: Now, I probably should have had you come
into chambers and we could discuss this and see if I can't

9
1

get these issues resolved.

2

MR. OLIVER: We'll be happy to come back there.

3

THE COURT: Why don't we do that.

4

And I think it

might be very helpful and meaningful if we do that.

5

(Recess)

6

(In Chambers)

7

THE COURT: Plaintiff has proposed a division of the

8

real estate in lieu of paying alimony.

9

this, is that correct?

That's as I view

10

MS. LEMS: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

11

going to propose today that that would be an equitable

12

distribution or taking one half and one half of the

13

properties, splitting them in half.

14
15

And we were

THE COURT: If we split the property in half.

Now,

what is your total income now?

16

MS. COLLINS: $873 (inaudible).

17

THE COURT: $873 plus --

18

MR. COLLINS: $1073.

19

MS. COLLINS: Mine and my daughters.

20

THE COURT: $1073, yeah.

21

MR. COLLINS: Total.

22

THE COURT: Total.

23

MS. LEMS: He is making $3,016 a month.

24

THE COURT: Okay.

Okay.

His is?

If the Court divided the property

25

equally and whether that can be done or not, I don't know.

26

mean, the rental units amount to about $800 a month

I

10
1 I supposedly clear made off the rentals, is that right or is
2 | that just the gross profit?
3 |

MS. LEMS: That's not the net profit, no.

4|

MR. OLIVER: Well -THE COURT: That must be --

6 I

MR. OLIVER: I think that's speculative as to

7

exactly what the net profit would be.

8

repairs and so forth.

9

It depends on the

THE COURT: I doubt very much (inaudible) payments.

10

I don f t know the value out here in Tooele like some other

11

places I have been, but if I just divided the property equal,

12

he is going to still pay some alimony.

13

the property equally and he is making three and she is

14

getting a thousand, he is going to have to pay a certain

15

amount of alimony.

16

So, if you divided

MS. LEMS: We propose that if we do the half and

17

half, that he would pay $300 a month in alimony for ten years

18

at which time that matter could be readdressed without a

19

petition to modify.

20

MR. OLIVER: Our position on that, Your Honor, is

21

that $3 00 with one half the property division is not

22

sufficient to maintain my client.

23

the rental income along with the alimony would not even make

24

her house payment, which doesn f t give her a lot to live on --

As*a matter of fact, from

25

THE COURT: N o , it f s not.

26

MR. OLIVER: -- when she takes into consideration

11
her SSI and so forth.

But she has had to borrow a

2

substantial amount of money during the pendency of this

3

action.
THE COURT: I don't doubt that.

4
5

What about the

child, though?
MR. OLIVER: There is another issue that I think we

6
7

need to raise at this point in time and that is that we don't

8

believe the Court is ultimately going to find the $3,016 as

9

his final income.

10

that has brought him in since the first of this year --

11
12

We believe that he has several side jobs

THE COURT: What about the tax returns?

What do the

tax returns show?
MR. OLIVER: I don't know that the tax returns show

13
14

the part time jobs, Your Honor, but we have got people who

15

will testify, and we've got canceled checks and so forth

16

showing that he has received probably about $5,000 since the

17

first of this year on side jobs,

18

MS. LEMS: And thatf s not net, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT: But it hasn't been reported on their

20

income tax return?
MS. LEMS: No.

21

They haven't filed income tax

22

returns for several years.

23

this part time is, but they havenft filed it.
THE COURT: Both of you are going to be liable for

24
25
26

Notwithstanding how intelligent

that.
MS. LEMS: We also have on our end, testimony

12
1

through a deposition where she stated that her father is

2

paying her anywhere from $600 to $700 a month, friends and

3

family are providing at least a couple of thousand dollars a

4

month to her.

5

effect is considered income.

So, under the statute any gifts or any of that

6

MR. OLIVER: They are loans.

7

THE COURT: Pardon?

8

MR. OLIVER: They are loans.

9

THE COURT: I don't believe that.

I think the

10

alimony, well, the alimony award, I don't see any way out of

11

it.

12

be enough.

13

is getting the --

Divide the property and alimony at $300 a month may not
What about the child?

It is because of her she

14

MR. OLIVER: That's correct.

Stuff he has to sign.

15

THE COURT: So he is alleviated that obligation

16

evidently by getting the social security and paying for the

17

child.

18

equalize it out.

Her total income would be about equal to

19

what he has got.

And they both share the debts equally and

20

divide the property up equally.

21
22
23

So he has got to pay more than (inaudible).

I will

MS. LEMS: So what is the Court's suggestion if we
do divide it equally, how much alimony are we looking at?
THE COURT: Well, it depends on -- if he has got --

24

if she has got a $1,073 now and what's his net after taxes,

25

what is his taxes?

26

MS. LEMS: He made for '96 $36,200.

13
1
2

THE COURT: No, I mean, his monthly, what is his
monthly income after he pays his taxes and et cetera? $1,600?

3

MS. LEMS: I'd have to look at it, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

It's about fifty percent of it.

He

5

gets $3,000 a month -- what's his take home, let's put it

6

that way?

7

MS. LEMS: I have his last pay stub, Your Honor,

8

it's in my other exhibits.

He has the health insurance

9

coming off and the life insurance coming off and --

10

THE COURT: Well, what of his net (inaudible)?

11

MS. LEMS: Well, we have also proposed how I have it

12

in my trial brief as well giving an equitable distribution,

13

giving him the one property and giving her the three

14

remaining ones.

15

THE COURT: I don't doubt that the property is

16

substantial, but like I always said, unless she sells the

17

property she is not going to realize a lot out of it because

18

if her mortgage (inaudible) generally you are lucky to have

19

the rental to cover the mortgage and all of the expense of

20

keeping the property up.

21

MS. LEMS: There is one --

22

THE COURT: That might be a burden on her to do

23
24

that.
MS. LEMS: There is one property that is paid in

25

full other than it has about a $318 payment to be made and

26

that one will be paid.

14
1
2

MR. OLIVER: And the problem with that piece of
property is that itfs actually owned in thirds.

3

THE COURT: Where are you looking at?

4

MR. OLIVER: Well, it's not reflected.

5

There is

actually a third party that is part of that.

6

THE COURT: Well, what is his take home?

7

MR. OLIVER: It looks like from his financial

8

declaration that I'm going off of, Your Honor, and I am going

9

to be subtracting out of that, just to let the Court know, a

10

savings plan that he puts $140 per month into and a credit

11

union which is $310.

I'm leaving the balance of the

12

deductions in place.

That takes off $450 off of $83 8 so that

13

would come down to be about, if I'm not mistaken, about $388.

14

MS. LEMS: Plus he pays $80 in health insurance.

15

MR. OLIVER: So $2,374 plus $450 would be $2,824.

16

It looks like that is his net income.

17

THE COURT: Twenty-eight hundred?

18

MR. OLIVER: Twenty-eight hundred.

19

THE COURT: That would be a little high, wouldn't

20
21

it?

I mean, $3,000 a month -MR. COLLINS: I would say based on three grand a

22

month after you deduct the health and life insurance and the

23

(inaudible).

Two grand (inaudible).

24

THE COURT: Yeah.

25

MR. COLLINS: My take home - - m y checks -- like the

26

last check I got was for $890.

15
1 I

MS. LEMS: And I can pull those stubs if you would

2 I like, Your Honor.
3

MR. OLIVER: One of the problems that we have got

4

though, is he is making payments on his personal vehicle and

5

so forth out of this check.

6
7

THE COURT: But I don't think -- you just said that
he is making, grossing $3,016.

8
9

He has got netting at $2,800.

MR. OLIVER: Now, let me just tell you where we come
from.

This come off of his financial declarations that has

10

been submitted to the Court.

11

am not guessing anything.

That's what I am relying on.

12

THE COURT: (Inaudible).

13

MR. OLIVER: He also has included an extra $200 in

14

this.

15

work which is not consistent or dependable."

16

per month on that.

17

looking at their figures on this financial declaration.

18

takes it up to $3,212.

19

Income Taxes of $150.

It says, "All other sources specified contracting side
And he put $200

So that takes it up to $3,212.

I'm
That

Then he pulls out State and Federal
Number of exemptions taken, 6.

20

THE COURT: That won't cover his income tax.

21

MS. LEMS: If I can pull his check stubs, then we

22

can look right at those.

23
24
25
26

I

THE COURT: Let's get the check stub and let's look
at it.
MR. OLIVER: I understand.

But I am just going

straight off his financial declaration.

That's where I am

16
1

reading from.
THE COURT: That's why I am bothered by that is that

2
3
4

MS. LEMS: We have got a whole slew of them here,

5

Your Honor, so we can look at whatever ones you want.

6

want me to grab the most recent one?

7

THE COURT: Yeah.

8

MS. LEMS: Here's a pay period one, Your Honor, 6-

9

97.

That's the most recent.

10
11

MR. COLLINS:
that.

12
13

Do you

Right?

Well, it's not.

We're more than

But that's certainly within the ballpark.
MS. LEMS: I'll double check then, Your Honor,

because I believe that's --

14

MR. COLLINS: That's four and a half hours, six and

15

a half hours of overtime which is nonexistent at this point.

16
17

MS. LEMS: That's the most recent one I have, Your
Honor.

18
19

THE COURT: So that's $2,804.

That's what he is

taking home.

20

MS. LEMS: That's on the income, that's on the

21

overtime and the testimony will show and we have also got

22

verification from the postal service that they have done

23

cutbacks through the U.S. Postal Service and that overtime is

24

no longer available.

25
26

THE COURT: So how much overtime is involved in this
check?

1
1

MR. ROLLINS: Well, the "o" here signifies --

they

2

do it in hundreds.

So there is 9800 hundreds, that's two

3

hours and there is a four and a half, so six and a half hours

4

of overtime on that check, which comes to a hundred --

5

THE COURT: One hundred and ninety-six.

So you take

6

it down and that brings you down to $2,600. $2,600 and she

7

has got $1,073.

I think (inaudible) $2,500.

8

MR. COLLINS: So, $1,150.

9

THE COURT: So the alimony (inaudible) at $600.

10

MS. LEMS: Is that in addition to the child support?

11

THE COURT: She f s not paying any child support

12

because -- she only gave me -- how much are you getting in

13

child support, $1,073; right?

14
15

MS. COLLINS: That's my social security money.
That's not child support.

16
17

THE COURT: I thought I saw in here that you were
getting so much per month for a child?

18

MS. COLLINS: $386 because I am disabled.

19

THE COURT: So you are getting this $386 for child

20

and --

21

MS. COLLINS: I get $1,073 total.

22

THE COURT: That's what I said, $1,073.

So, if he

23

pays about $600 that makes you about equal, the two of you.

24

And so, how do you want to break it down as to that child

25

support or alimony, I don't know.

26

getting that income.

(Inaudible) the child is

18
1 I

MS. LEMS: So, are you suggesting, Your Honor, just

2 | to make sure that I am clear, that we would divide the
3 J properties in half and that he would pay $600 a month then in
4

alimony?

5

THE COURT: Right.

6

MS. LEMS: And there would be no other additional

7

sums owing on child support --

8

THE COURT: No.

9

MS. LEMS: -- since she does get dependent

10

disability income for the child.

11

THE COURT: Right.

Right.

12

MR. OLIVER: Now, just for my information

13

clarification, the $600 is that a round figure or are we

14

going to ultimately divide it in half?

15
16
17

THE COURT: Well, I think that's close enough.

I am

going to leave it at that.
MR. OLIVER: The reason I say that is because I

18

think it comes out closer to $750 if we take -- and you round

19

it down to $2,500.

20
21
22

THE COURT: Right.

And, yeah, Ifm going to give him'

the benefit of the doubt, $2,500.

And I think if he pays --

MR. OLIVER: And I think that her income, rather

23

than $1,073, because that actually includes child support as

24

we have defined it.

25

THE COURT: Sure.

Right.

26

MR. OLIVER: But even taking it at $1,073, that

19
1 | would still come out to be $600.
2 I
3

THE COURT: She would be making -- she would be
getting $1,673 a month.

4
5

MR. OLIVER: And he would be getting $1,900 and
something.

6

THE COURT: No.

7

MR. OLIVER: Yeah.

8

He wouldn't be getting that much.
If you took $600 off $2,500 he

would be getting $1,900.
THE COURT: L e t f s see.

9
10

About $1,900.

MR. OLIVER: So, if we are going to split it, then

11

it would be about another $150 difference.

12

asked the question.

13

That f s why I

THE COURT: Just divide everything equally.

The

14

only thing I can do is divide it all equally.

15

well, get to that now.

16

fees and if we are going to divide it up equal, they are

17

going to pay all the debts, split the debts, each pay their

18

own fees and costs.

19

She pays --

She'll pay her fees and he'll pay his

MS. LEMS: There is an issue on debts, Your Honor,

20

in the sense that we can show from all the ZCMI and other

21

credit charges, and so forth, that after the parties

22

separation --

23
24

THE COURT: Anything after the separation she has to
pay.

25

MR. LEMS: It should be their own separate debts.

26

THE COURT: Yeah, each pay their own.

20
1 I

MR. OLIVER: We have no problem with that.

2 I

THE COURT: Pardon?

3

MR. OLIVER: We have no problem with debts acquired

4
5

after the separation.
THE COURT: Yeah.

Pay that and then each pay your

6

own fees and you are going to split this (inaudible)

7

substantial equity in the houses, if you have to sell the

8

house, you have to sell the house.

9

MS. LEMS: Then, what are we looking on if we are

10

going to take the properties in half, we were wanting the 98

11

North Fort; is that correct, along with the 280 West one?

12

THE COURT: You decide which property --

13

MR. COLLINS: I think they would prefer that I took

14

the 118 because Tina is involved in that one.

15

MS. LEMS: Do you feel comfortable with that?

16

THE COURT: So if you did it that way, that's about

17
18
19

the only way we can do it.
MS. LEMS: And $600 in alimony to her for what
period of time are we looking at?

20

THE COURT: Well, it's permanent.

21

MR. OLIVER: Again, I want a clarification.

22
23
24
25
26

saying $600 or are you saying split?

Are you

So they --

THE COURT: Just divide it equally.

Just divide

everything equally, right down the center.
MR. OLIVER: So we take it and we add up both
incomes and split it in half and each is going to get half of

21
that?
2

THE COURT: Yeah.

3

their own fees and costs.

4

figure.

5

figure it out.

Half of the property and each pay
Well, I am just giving a rough

I mean, you have got the calculators.

You can

6

MR. COLLINS: Am I allowed to speak here?

7

THE COURT: Sure.

8

MR. COLLINS: That is my annual salary.

9

THE COURT: Yeah.

10
11

MR. COLLINS: Okay.
salary is $1,073.

12
13

So we have taken her monthly

THE COURT: Take the annual.

Just figure it by

annual.

14

MR. COLLINS: So we divide this by twelve again.

I

15

am making $3,600 a month and I am making a lot of payments on

16

health insurance and this sort of thing.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

THE COURT: Well, she has got to pay half the health
insurance.
MR. COLLINS: Well, my health insurance is heavily
subsidized through the -THE COURT: I know.

But whatever it is she has got

to pay half.
MS. LEMS: I don't know if his plan administrator
will allow her to stay on the health insurance when -THE COURT: She won't, but the child can.
stay so you take her off.

She can't

22
1 I

MR. COLLINS: Well, I have no objection to paying.

2 I I think itfs only like $18 a pay period to keep my child on
3 I it and I don't have an objection to paying that.
4

THE COURT: Okay.

That's nine dollars a month.

5

MR. OLIVER: But he's not paying any child support.

6

THE COURT: Yeah.

7

MR. OLIVER: So, I think that that should just be

8

awash at minimum. I mean, he is not paying anything in child

9

support.

10

He is getting benefits -MS. LEMS: Well, he has committed to pay the nine

11

dollars that it is going to cost to keep the child on there.

12

That's not a problem.

13

THE COURT: Yeah.

So why don't you get your

14

calculators out and figure it out and you need to take the

15

property, and if you can't arrive -- put it this way: if you

16

can't arrive at a division of the property, I'll just order

17

that it be sold and divide the cash.

18

the Memorandum there is substantial equities in those

19

properties and if you are going to sell them, this is the

20

time to sell.

21

Because according to

MS. COLLINS: Are we talking just the rentals or we

22

talking the home, my daughters home, too?

23

THE COURT: Everything.

Everything.

Sell

24

everything.

Each has first chance to buy it, first option of

25

purchasing.

So you can just divide it and sell it or come to

26

an agreement of who takes what.

2
1
2

MR. OLIVER: Would it be possible to have the
alimony set up on a direct deposit from the employer?

3

THE COURT: No.

4

MR. COLLINS:

5

He can just pay it.
I think I should have the option of

in good faith making those payments and if I --

6

THE COURT: If you don't, then we'll get direct --

7

If you want to on that alimony, if you want to take part of

8

it child support or you want to take it in alimony, that's up

9

to you to decide.

But I think in the calculation for the

10

child support, you have to take into account that $289.

11

don't have a chart informing me how much he would be entitled

12

to, but that's (inaudible) or take your income and his income

13

and figure it out. So, however you want to work it.

14

MS. LEMS: But at this point if we take the

15

differences in their income and divide it in half as the

16

Court suggested, you are looking at $713.50.

17
18
19
20
21

I

MR. OLIVER: With an equal distribution of the
property.
THE COURT: Right, it's got to be equal.

Everything

has to be equal.
MR. OLIVER: Well, now, I am actually willing to

22

take -- are we operating under the assumption that if we take

23

the presumed value of the property, since we haven't had

24

these appraised, if we can agree on the value of the property

25

and we say, "Okay.

26

the net worth of that property is $30,000?

It's worth $50,000 and we owe $20,000,

24
1
2

THE COURT: Whatever you two work out on the
division of properties is fine with me.

3
4

M S . LEMS: We have already worked that out, Your
Honor.

5

THE COURT: Then, if you are agreeable to that, then

6

that's fine.

7

you have in mind offsetting the value of the property versus

8

alimony.

9
10

But that doesn't -- I mean, if one gets too,

MS. COLLINS: I will take the property and no
alimony.

11

MR. OLIVER: Okay.

12

THE COURT: I just want to save you the time and

13

expense

14

that's about all a judge can do in a fifteen year marriage.

15
16
17

(inaudible).

Let's go outside and talk.

If you read all of the Utah cases,

MS. LEMS: Well, I think it's fairly reasonable that
we do it that way and that's what the case law says.
MR. OLIVER: The other thing that I think we might

18

be able to resolve here is an issue with regards to some

19

personal property.

20

There was a couch and a chair and an ottoman purchased from

21

R.C. Willey's by the parties.

22

he wants either the couch or the chair and the ottoman.

23

client wants all three pieces of property based upon the fact

24

that Mr. Collins also wants the camper and he has the

25

motorcycle that was purchased during the marriage and we

26

don't have a problem with him taking the camper and the

I don't think there is a lot of dispute.

What Mr. Collins says is that
My

1 I motorcycle.

We would like the furniture in exchange.

I

2 I think that's really about the only property issue that we are
3

talking about.

4

he is also getting all of his tools which has a substantial

5

value to offset other things, but I think that's the only

6

property issue we are talking about.

7

There is other things that are involved and

MS. LEMS: And, Your Honor, the reason that we

8

suggested that we split whatever the parties purchased

9

together at R.C. Willey, is we are not requesting any type of

10

interest in the Ford Bronco that she has purchased with funds

11

from the second mortgage.

12

THE COURT: Why don't you take the furniture and

13

divide that up, too.

14

of it.

15
16

He gets part of that and she gets part

MS. LEMS: We are not asking for any other
furniture.

17

THE COURT: Well, that's no problem.

18

MS. LEMS: Whatever works for Mr. Oliver and his

19

client, we'll be willing to take the chair or the couch.

20

MR. OLIVER: We'll take the camper.

21

MS. LEMS: We can sell the camper.

22

He can take --

The camper is

worth about $500, you know.

23

MR. OLIVER: Why don't we just sell the camper and

24

split the proceeds. That would make a simple solution to that

25

one.

26

MS. COLLINS: What about the motorcycle?

26
MS. LEMS: Well, if we get into that, we'll end up

1
2

in

3

MR. COLLINS: We're back to square one.

I purchased

the motorcycle --

4
5 I

THE COURT: Let me tell you what I think.

One

6

thing. Now, you can be here and you go to trial, you will

7

spend more money on attorney's fees than what you are

8

fighting about.

9

things resolved, you have to be reasonable.

So be reasonable.

10 I and death matter.

In order to get these
It's not a life

You know, I don't know why people -- what

11

price you put on peace of mind.

12

another over a piece of furniture or over a $500 camper?

13

it worth it?

14

Is it worth fighting one
Is

Like I have seen here, I just had a case here not

15

too long ago, the people wound up owing the attorneys more

16

than their estate was worth.

17

fine.

18

pretty well tied.

19

divide everything equally, but, gees, if you are going to be

20

fighting about a camper or some furniture, then (inaudible)

21

pretty well assured of getting your alimony regularly, unless

22

they fire him, that's highly unlikely as a postal worker, so

23

look at the pluses.

24

alimony that never get paid.

25

take and I think you can get this worked out.

26

So, if you want to do that,

I can take the bench and (inaudible).

My hands are

I have some discretion, but I am going to

I have so many come in that are awarded
So, just have a little give and

MS. LEMS: I agree, Your Honor.

1 I

MR. OLIVER: If you can give us just a few minutes,

2 I I think we can work it out.
3
4

THE COURT: Sure.

All afternoon I am here.

Thank

you.

5

MS. LEMS: Thank you.

6

(Recess)

7

THE COURT: This is the matter of Robert D. Collins

8

versus Patricia Collins.

Case No. 964300201.

Let the record

9

indicate that the plaintiff is present represented by Ms.

10

Lems and the defense present represented by Mr. Oliver.

11

it's my understanding a stipulation has been reached in this

12

case?

13

MS. LEMS: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

14

MR. OLIVER: Yes, Your Honor, we do have a

15

stipulation.

16
17

And

And I'll let Ms. Lems recite.

THE COURT: If you will step up here to the lectern
so that it will be picked up on the machine here?

18

MS. LEMS: Sure, Your Honor.

The parties have

19

agreed that the plaintiff will be awarded the property

20

located at 280 West Vine and that the remaining properties

21

including the marital home will be awarded to the defendant.

22

Both of the parties will assume any and all liability on

23

those properties holding the other harmless thereon.

24

The parties have agreed that the plaintiff will pay

25

the defendant $300 a month in alimony for a period of ten

26

years.

At that time the alimony will terminate unless the

28
1

defendant brings some sort of motion, she doesn't have to

2

bring a Petition to Modify to have that revisited.

3

The amount that the defendant is receiving for the

4

minor child on the disability income will substitute as any

5

type of child support.

6

child support that the plaintiff has to pay the defendant.

7

Therefore, there will be no order of

The parties will take one half each of the marital

8

debts.

9

parties marriage up until the date of the parties separation

10
11

Those are any debts that were incurred during the

which was January 3rd of 1996.
The personal property of the parties, the plaintiff

12 I will be awarded the camper free and clear from any interest
13

that the defendant may have in that.

In exchange for that,

14

the defendant will be awarded the chair, couch and ottoman

15

that the parties purchased through R.C. Willey, free and

16

clear from any claim of interest by the plaintiff.

17

Also, the plaintiff has agreed to pay an

18

outstanding charge that has been incurred with one of the

19

defendant's doctors.

20

will be verified through counsel and evidently that charge

21

was for a mouth guard.

22

reasonable time and I would suggest within thirty days of the

23

receipt of that.

24

We believe that that sum is $262.

That

He has agreed to pay that within a

There is also an issue of property being in the

25

118th North property that we have agreed through the

26

stipulation to award to the defendant that belongs to the

29
1

plaintiff.

2

there and so forth.

3

time, to remove any of his personal property from that

4

residence.

Honor?
THE COURT: Ms. Lems, would you repeat again for the

7
8

Clerk's benefit the amount of alimony?
MS. LEMS: The amount of alimony is $300 a month for

9
10

He is to have thirty days, a reasonable

Now, if you will just give me one more minute, Your

5
6

Some of his personal property and the camper is

ten years.

11

THE COURT: Okay, fine.

Proceed.

12

MS. LEMS: We also need - - i n opportunity, we've

13 I agreed by prior stipulation with this Court today that there
14

were items of personal belonging that are in the marital home

15

that the plaintiff is entitled to.

16

that the parties be able to contact one another, either

17

through a third party, whether itfs Mr. Oliver or I, or they

18

contact one another on the phone and arrange a date and time

19

mutual to them that the plaintiff can go with the police

20

officers to remove that personal property.

21

Again, we would suggest

Now, evidently, there's at the last minute been

22

brought up an issue of cabinets.

And I apologize to the

23

Court, but this is a new issue.

24

that the plaintiff has made that are stored, about three

25

pieces, in the 118th North property.

26

of that said cabinet stored in the marital home where the

Evidently there are cabinets

There is also one piece

30
1 | plaintiff resides.

The plaintiff was stating that she wants

2 I that one cabinet and my client is stating that that is part
3

of a set and he would like those cabinets.

4

to have to decide what we are doing with the cabinets.

5

So, we are going

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, we have done our best to

6

resolve the personal property issue.

We got to really --

7

when we went before the Court, we talked about the division

8

of personal property. We talked about the division of really

9

a camper and some furniture and we have resolved everything

10

else.

11

had enumerated the property that he felt that he was entitled

12

to.

13

balance of the property remaining at the marital residence

14

was to be my client 1 s.

We had negotiated that in good faith.

15
16

The basis for the resolution was that the plaintiff

And then the

THE COURT: Well, that's what, one cabinet?

He gets

the other two.

17

MS. LEMS: Well, they are a set evidently.

18

the three cabinets and then the other piece of the cabinet --

19

He has

MR. COLLINS: There are about six of them. I

20

purchased them myself.

21

in the garage over there.

22

becoming an issue?

23

much my personal property as the dishes, and that sort of

24

thing.

25
26

One of them coincidentally is still
Now, why in the world is this

I would presume that they are just as

THE COURT: They are not installed in the house?
They are just sitting --

31

1

MS. LEMS: They are not installed.

2

MR. OLIVER: Yes, Your Honor, and my client desires

3

that they be mounted in the garage.

4

MS. COLLINS: In my house.

5

MR. OLIVER: In the house.

6

THE COURT: Now there is one and how many is --

7

MS. COLLINS: They are upper cabinets for a kitchen.

8

MR. OLIVER: My client just indicated it's a bank of

9

upper cabinets for the kitchen.

10

in the house.

11

them as such.

She would like them mounted

She intends to do so.

She had intended to use

12

THE COURT: And what about the other two?

13

MS. LEMS: Well, there is evidently, according to my

14

client, six pieces to this cabinet.

15

over at the 118th North property that he has stored there and

16

then the other piece --

17

He has the five that are

THE COURT: Well, he takes the five and she wants

18

the one, well, then just -- am I understanding?

19

five in your possession now?

20

MR. COLLINS: I purchased them.

You have the

They are mine.

21

a matter of fact, one of the people was here as a witness.

22

bought brand new cabinets for him, anyway, I bought these

23

cabinets from him.

24

MS. COLLINS: After the separation?

25

MR. COLLINS: No, prior to the separation.

26

years ago.

Two

As

I
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THE COURT: And she wants one of them and he wants

1
2

the other five; correct?

3

MR. OLIVER: We just want what is in our possession.

4

I mean, we are not arguing over the cabinets.

5

after the resolution.

6

right now, and this is the first time that they have been

7

mentioned because we assumed --

8
9

This came up here in the courtroom

THE COURT: Let me get this straight.

Where are the

cabinets located now?

10
11

This came up

MS. LEMS: Five pieces of the cabinets are at 118th
North?

12

THE COURT: And that's in whose possession?

13

MS. LEMS: That's going to be in her possession.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MS. LEMS: But it has been used and he has his

16

property stored there.

17
18

THE COURT: Now, what are the cabinets worth?

What

did you pay for them?

19

MR. COLLINS: Twelve hundred dollars.

20

MR. OLIVER: And one set of the cabinets are located

21

at my client's residence where she lives and that's the set

22

that she wants.

23
24
25

MR. COLLINS: She can have that one.

Let her have

it.
MS. LEMS: Okay.

I think we can agree that the

26 I plaintiff can be awarded the one set of cabinets that she has

33
1 | in her possession at the marital residence and the remaining
2 I cabinets that are located at 118th North will be awarded to
3

the plaintiff.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MS. LEMS: I think that does our stipulation, Your

6

Honor.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MR. OLIVER: If I can just have one moment?

9

is a couple of clarifications, Your Honor, for me.

There
First

10

off, in regards to the child support, the order should read

11

something to the effect that so long as --

12
13

THE COURT: As the government is paying for it,
social security?

14

MR. OLIVER: That's correct.

15

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to get in trouble.

16

MR. OLIVER: Yeah.

She is entitled to readdress it

in the event that that amount terminates.

19

THE COURT: Sure.

20

MR. OLIVER: And then also we would ask the

21

plaintiff to use due diligence in locating a 30.06 that

22

belongs to my client.

23

it.

If he has it in his possession, return

24

THE COURT: If he has it, return it.

25

MR. COLLINS: It's probably with my chain saws

26

I

was going to call that to your attention anyhow.

17
18

Otherwise --

somewhere.

If not --

34
1 I

MS. LEMS: We have no problem with that, Your Honor.

2 I

THE COURT: Okay.

3 1

MS. LEMS: That does it.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

to stipulation as read in the record.

6

stipulation?

Is that it?

Now, Mr. Collins, you have agreed
Do you concur in the

7

MR. COLLINS: Yes.

8

THE COURT: Mrs. Collins, you have agreed to

9

stipulation on the record.

Do you concur in the stipulation?

10

MS. COLLINS: Yes, sir.

11

THE COURT: And now, it f s my understanding that the

12

plaintiff is going to take the divorce?

13

MR. OLIVER: W e f d like mutual, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Huh?

15

MR. OLIVER: We'd like mutual.

16

THE COURT: Mutual?

17

MS. LEMS: One more clarification, Your Honor.

Why?
It's

18

our understanding in checking with the court clerk on Monday

19

that the defendant has not attended the divorce education

20

class.

21

hopefully within three days these parties can be divorced.

22

THE COURT: I think I can waive that if you want?

23

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, my client has viewed the

We request that she attend that forthwith and

24

video on that.

I am not sure certificate wise where that

25

goes, but my client has viewed the video.

26

participated in the course as is provided in the judgment.

She has
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1

THE COURT: But there is no hope.

I don't think

2

that a divorce education class is going to help any in this

3

case, so --

4

MS. LEMS: It's for the children, not for them.

5

THE COURT: I know it's for the children.

6

MR. OLIVER: But she has viewed the video, so it's

7

(inaudible).

8

THE COURT: So for all practical purposes, she has

9

complied, which I'll find to be the case.

10

takes me up on appeal on that issue, now.

11

Okay.

It's a mutual divorce.

I hope no one

So, if each one of

12

you want to come forward then, Mr. Collins, and you'll be

13

sworn.

14
15

MR. OLIVER: Do you want to swear them both at the
same time, Your Honor?

16

THE COURT: Yeah, both stand up.

17

CLERK: Raise your right hands.

18

(Parties sworn)

19

THE COURT: Okay.

20

M s . Lems, do you want to take the

stand here?

21

ROBERT D. COLLINS

22

Having been duly and legally sworn

23

was examined and testified on his

24

oath as follows:

25
26

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. LEMS
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1

Q

2

the record?

3

A

Robert Collins.

4

Q

And you and the defendant were married on what

A

25th of June 1983.

Q

And have you resided in the County of Tooele three

5

date?

7 I
8

Mr. Collins, will you please state your name for

months prior to filing the divorce complaint in this action?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And has that been your primary residence, in

11
12

Tooele, Utah?
A

Yes.

13

MS. LEMS: Anything else, Your Honor?

14

THE COURT: Well, on the grounds.

15

MS. LEMS: Oh, okay.

16
17
18

EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT
Q

You state irreconcilable differences.

Can you tell

19

the Court what some of the problems were that existed at the

20

time you filed the complaint?

You didn't get along?

21

A

Primarily, constant arguing.

22

Q

And it became impossible to continue the marriage

23
24
25
26

relationship because of your arguing back and forth?
A

Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.

Now, you step down and Mrs.

Collins, you can take the stand.
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I
1

MR. OLIVER: May I examine her from here, Your

2

Honor, or do you wish that she take the stand?

3

THE COURT: Sure.

4

No, that's fine.

PATRICIA M. COLLINS

5 j

Having been duly and legally sworn

6 I

was examined and testified on her
oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. OLIVER
10 |

Q

State your name for the record, please.

11 |

A

Patricia (inaudible).

12

Q

Were you married to Bob Collins, Robert Collins?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And you heard the testimony of Robert Collins.

15

Were you asked the same questions, would your response be the

16

same?

17

A

Except why we split up.

18

Q

Okay.

19
20
21

And so tell the Court why it is that you

split up?
A

Because he was abusive and he assaulted me.
THE COURT: And because of his conduct, it became

22

impossible to continue the marriage relationship.

23

will grant a mutual divorce to the parties that is supposed

24

to become final upon entry of the stipulation of complaint on

25

file herein.

26

Monday, I guess.

Okay.

The Court

The Court will be in recess, then, until

38
CLERK: Who is going to prepare the order?
MS. LEMS: I'd be happy to.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LEMS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Proceedings concluded)
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September 8, 1997

Wendy J. Lems
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
D. Bruce Oliver
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Dear Miss Lems - Mr. Oliver
Pursuant to Respondent's objection to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree, I have reviewed the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in light of the objections, I
have granted Respondent's objections only to those paragraphs
which I have interlineated.
I've enclosed a copy of the paragraphs which I have
interlineated for each of you for your perusal.
Miss Lems shall prepare the Findings of fact and Conclusions
of Law in accordance with the interlineations. I trust you will
make the necessary changes in the Conclusions of Law and Decree.
Respectfully

OOOfcdC

JEROME H. MOONEY #2303
WENDY J. LEMS, #7409
MOONEY LAW FIRM, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
ROBERT D. COLLINS,

:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIA M. COLLINS,
Respondent.

:
:

Case No. 964300201
Judge: Hon. John A. Rokich

—oooOooo—
This matter having been submitted to the Honorable John A. Rokich, of the aboveentitled Court, on the 11th day of June, 1997, upon stipulation of the parties, and in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. ,§30-3-4 (Supp., 1995), and Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent,
Patricia M. Collins, having entered into a Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and
Property Settlement with the Court on June 11, 1997 before the Honorable John A. Rokich,
whereon the parties consented to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, consented that pleadings
should be withdrawn and the Court having heard testimony from the parties regarding the
parties' residency, marriage date, grounds and their request that a mutual Decree of Divorce be

entered pursuant to the terms of the parties Stipulation, and the Court having determined that
more than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and the
Court having determined that the parties have either completed the divorce counseling or have
listened to the tape regarding the divorce counseling requirement, and the Court having reviewed
the records and files herein and being fully advised of the premises, and the Court having made
and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon stipulation of
the parties and motion of Wendy J. Lems of Mooney Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for Petitioner;
The Court does make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah for
more than three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action.

2.

Respondent, Patricia M. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah
for more that three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action.

3.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married on June 25, 1983
in Tooele, Utah.

4.

Petitioner and Respondent separated on January 03, 1996.

5.

Petitioner and Respondent maintain their marital domicile in Tooele County, State of
Utah.

6.

Irreconcilable differences have occurred between the parties making continuation of the
marriage impossible.

7.

The Court finds and has entered the oral stipulation for Decree of Divorce and Property
Settlement which was entered by the Court during the hearing held June 11, 1997,
2

concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support and debts, and
other related matters which the Court now finds to be fair and equitable.
There is one child as issue of this marriage, adopted by the parties during their marriage;
to wit: Caitlin Collins born August 24, 1989.
Utah is the home state of the child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(a).
Neither Petitioner or Respondent have been a party, witness or participated in any other
capacity in any other litigation concerning the custody of the child in the State of Utah or
any other state, with the exception of the adoption of the minor child.
Neither Petitioner or Respondent have any information of any custody proceedings
concerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state.
Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of
the minor child. The Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the primary
physical custody of the minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be
with the Respondent.
That the Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay zero (0) dollars in child support to the
Respondent as long as the Respondent is receiving social security disability benefits on
behalf of the minor child. In the event that the Respondent does not receive social
security disability income benefits on behalf of the minor child, the matter of the
obligation and payment of child support may be revisited with the Court.
The Petitioner is awarded unsupervised visitation with the minor child pursuant to the
Utah Minimum Schedule for Visitation §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. (Supp., 1996).

3

15.

The Petitioner will elect Wednesdays as his mid-week visitation day from 5:30 p.m. until
8:30 p.m., unless the parties can mutually agree otherwise.

16.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to abstain from the use of any alcohol 24Jho_ur& prior to
visitation with the minor child or at any time during visitation with the minor child. In
the event that the Respondent reasonably believes that the Petitioner has been drinking
alcohol,

ic^ap^^j^lc4<^^
titt&^^tt&tt^^

visitation

^cy until fuithci investigation by the appropriate
with the minor child will be suspendec
police authoritica'or pureuanMo the appropriate expedited hearing before the Court.
17.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month in alimony to the
Respondent for a period often (10) years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce by
the Court. Upon the expiration of the ten (10) year period, in the year 2007, alimony to
the Respondent shall terminate and any further obligation to pay spousal support to the
Respondent may be revisited by the Respondent through an appropriate motion to the
Court.

18.

Alimony in this matter will terminate prior to the year 2007 in the event that Respondent
remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite sex.

19.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded the property located at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah.
The Petitioner will assume any and all liability of the 280 West Vine property and will be
entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The Respondent will be held
harmless from any and all liability or debt on the 280 West Vine property and the
Respondent will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property in the amount
of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that Petitioner defaults

in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability on said property.
Respondent is entitled to foreclose her judgment lien on the property in the event of such
default.
20.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located
at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah in favor of the Petitioner within fifteen (15) days of the
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter,

21.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the marital home located at 32 North 200 West,
Tooele, Utah. The Respondent will assume any and all liability on said property, holding
the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment
lien on said property in the amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability,
in the event that Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or
other liability on said property. Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the
property in the event of such default.

22.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the rental properties located at 118 North 1st West,
Tooele, Utah and 98 North 4th Street, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and all liability thereon
and Respondent is entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The
Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property(s) in the
amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that
Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability
on said property(s). Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the property(s)
in the event of such default.
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The Petitioner is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located at
32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah; 118 North 1st West, Tooele, Utah; and 98 North 4th
Street, Tooele, Utah. The Quit Claim Deed will be executed within a reasonable time and
no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
The personal property of the parties will be awarded as previously divided by the parties
with the following exceptions:
a.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded his camper free from any claim of interest by the
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon.

b.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the RC Wiley couch, chair and stool, free
from any claim of interest by the Petitioner and subject to any and all liability
thereon.

c.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all property that he has stored at any of
the rental units awarded to Respondent and is hereby ordered to remove said
property within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in
this matter.

d.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all tools or other personal belongings
that he has in the marital home's garage. Specifically, the Petitioner's two chain
saws, miter box and any other tools belonging to Petitioner if said tools are still in
Respondent's possession.

e.

The Respondent is hereby awarded her 30 aught 6 and Petitioner is hereby
ordered to return the gun if the gun is still in Petitioner's possession.
6

f.

The Respondent is awarded the one set cabinets that is remaining in the marital
home. The remaining cabinets are in the possession of the Petitioner and are
hereby awarded to Petitioner.

g.

Petitioner is hereby awarded his motorcycle free from any claim of interest by the
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon.

h.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to provide the home videos of the minor child
to the Petitioner to the Petitioner in a timely and reasonable manner for purposes
of Petitioner making copies of the home videos or in the alternative, the
Respondent can provide a copy of the home videos to the Petitioner in a
reasonable and timely manner.

i.

The Petitioner is awarded all of his mother's furniture including the rocking chair,
wash stand, china and silverware, couch and end tables.

j.

The Petitioner is awarded his grandfather's stop watch jf 4n the possession of the
Respondent-.

25.

k.

The Petitioner is awarded his father's coins.

1.

The Petitioner is awarded his godfather's dishes and pictures. UrY*^*/^*'

^^^^^

The Respondent is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of any retirement sums that have
accrued in Petitioner's retirement plan from the date of the parties marriage on June 26,
1983, to the date of the parties separation on January 3, 1996. The proceeds of the
retirement policy will be distributed pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
("QDRO") to be prepared by Respondent's counsel.

7

26.

The Petitioner is further ordered to maintain health insurance for the minor child,
provided it is reasonably available to him through his place of employment. The parties
will equally divide the costs of any premiums incurred within thirty (30) days of the
receipt thereon.

27.

The parties are each ordered to pay one-half of any non-insured medical expenses
[including deductibles, copayments and medications] incurred on behalf of the minor
child within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon.

28.

The parties will each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all work related day care incurred on
behalf of the minor child, within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon.

29.

The parties are ordered to refrain and restrain from engaging in any acts of disparaging,
harassing, intimidation or contacting one another with the exception that the parties may
contact one another as it relates to the minor child. The parties are further restrained from
discussing the divorce action in the presence of the minor child.

30

The Petitioner is ordered to pay the marital debts and obligations of the parties, holding
the Respondent harmless thereon, as follows:
a.

Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital debts and
obligations incurred by the parties during their period of marriage on June 25,
1983 through the parties' separation on January 3, 1996y U-LcJL

b.

- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ x - ^

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the dentist bill in the approximate amount
of $262 for the Respondent's mouth guard upon proper verification of said bill by
Respondent and within thirty (30) days upon receipt of said verification.

8

31.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the martial debts and
obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983 through
the parties' separation on January 3, 1996. uJfi^d^

32.

^>*^U^^

*

i^vc^f^F^

Any debts incurred by the parties, individually, since the parties separation on January 3,
1996, is awarded to them individually, free from any liability by the other party.

33.

The parties will cooperate in notifying creditors and pay their one-half of said marital
debts and obligations in a timely and efficient manner.

34.

Respondent is awarded the tax exemption on the minor child as long as Respondent is
receiving disability insurance on behalf of the minor child. In the event that Respondent
no longer receives disability insurance on behalf of the minor child, and the issue of child
support is readdressed by the Court, the issue of the award of the tax exemption can be
revisited by the Court.

35.

Neither party is awarded attorneys fees in this matter and each of the parties will bear
their own attorneys fees and costs in this matter.

36.

The parties are ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents necessary
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, Patricia M. Collins are mutually awarded
a Decree of Divorce from one another on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and
the same should become final upon signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
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2.

Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of
the minor child.

3.

Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded primary physical custody of the
minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be with the Respondent.

4.

The oral Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and Property Settlement was
entered by the Court on June 11, 1997 and more fully recited in the foregoing Findings of
Fact concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support, payment
of the debts and obligations of the parties and any other matters as more specifically set
forth above should be ratified, approved, and confirmed in all particulars, and the same
should be embodied into the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That judgment be ordered accordingly.
DATED this

day of

, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this^v£_ day of August, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the
following:
D. Bruce Oliver, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303
WENDY J. LEMS, #7409
MOONEY LAW FIRM, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
ROBERT D.COLLINS,
Petitioner,
vs.

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

PATRICIA M. COLLINS,
Respondent.

:
:

Case No. 964300201

:

Judge: Hon. John A. Rokich

—oooOooo—
This matter having been submitted to the Honorable John A. Rokich, of the aboveentitled Court, on the 11th day of June, 1997, upon stipulation of the parties, and in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. ,§30-3-4 (Supp., 1995), and Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent,
Patricia M. Collins, having entered into a Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and
Property Settlement with the Court on June 11, 1997 before the Honorable John A. Rokich,
whereon the parties consented to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, consented that pleadings
should be withdrawn and the Court having heard testimony from the parties regarding the
parties' residency, marriage date, grounds and their request that a mutual Decree of Divorce be

uOO^o

entered pursuant to the terms of the parties Stipulation, and the Court having determined that
more than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and the
Court having determined that the parties have either completed the divorce counseling or have
listened to the tape regarding the divorce counseling requirement, and the Court having reviewed
the records and files herein and being fully advised of the premises, and the Court having made
and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon stipulation of
the parties and motion of Wendy J. Lems of Mooney Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for Petitioner;
The Court does make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah for
more than three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action.

2.

Respondent, Patricia M. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah
for more that three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action.

3.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married on June 25, 1983
in Tooele, Utah.

4.

Petitioner and Respondent separated on January 03,1996.

5.

Petitioner and Respondent maintain their marital domicile in Tooele County, State of
Utah.

6.

Irreconcilable differences have occurred between the parties making continuation of the
marriage impossible.

7.

The Court finds and has entered the oral stipulation for Decree of Divorce and Property
Settlement which was entered by the Court during the hearing held June 11,1997,
2

concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support and debts, and
other related matters which the Court now finds to be fair and equitable.
8.

There is one child as issue of this marriage, adopted by the parties during their marriage;
to wit: Caitlin Collins born August 24,1989.

9.

Utah is the home state of the child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(a).

10.

Neither Petitioner or Respondent have been a party, witness or participated in any other
capacity in any other litigation concerning the custody of the child in the State of Utah or
any other state, with the exception of the adoption of the minor child.

11.

Neither Petitioner or Respondent have any information of any custody proceedings
concerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state.

12.

Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of
the minor child. The Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the primary
physical custody of the minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be
with the Respondent.

13.

That the Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay zero (0) dollars in child support to the
Respondent as long as the Respondent is receiving social security disability benefits on
behalf of the minor child. In the event that the Respondent does not receive social
security disability income benefits on behalf of the minor child, the matter of the
obligation and payment of child support may be revisited with the Court.

14.

The Petitioner is awarded unsupervised visitation with the minor child pursuant to the
Utah Minimum Schedule for Visitation §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. (Supp., 1996).

3
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15.

The Petitioner will elect Wednesdays as his mid-week visitation day from 5:30 p.m. until
8:30 p.m., unless the parties can mutually agree otherwise.

16.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to abstain from the use of any alcohol prior to visitation
with the minor child or at any time during visitation with the minor child. In the event
that the Respondent reasonably believes that the Petitioner has been drinking alcohol,
visitation with the minor child will be suspended for that visitation period only.

17.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month in alimony to the
Respondent for a period often (10) years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce by
the Court. Upon the expiration of the ten (10) year period, in the year 2007, alimony to
the Respondent shall terminate and any further obligation to pay spousal support to the
Respondent may be revisited by the Respondent through an appropriate motion to the
Court.

18.

Alimony in this matter will terminate prior to the year 2007 in the event that Respondent
remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite sex.

19.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded the property located at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah.
The Petitioner will assume any and all liability of the 280 West Vine property and will be
entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The Respondent will be held
harmless from any and all liability or debt on the 280 West Vine property and the
Respondent will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property in the amount
of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that Petitioner defaults
in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability on said property.

4
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Respondent is entitled to foreclose her judgment lien on the property in the event of such
default.
20.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located
at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah in favor of the Petitioner within fifteen (15) days of the
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter.

21.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the marital home located at 32 North 200 West,
Tooele, Utah. The Respondent will assume any and all liability on said property, holding
the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment
lien on said property in the amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability,
in the event that Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or
other liability on said property. Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the
property in the event of such default.

22.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the rental properties located at 118 North 1st West,
Tooele, Utah and 98 North 4th Street, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and all liability thereon
and Respondent is entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The
Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property(s) in the
amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that
Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability
on said property(s). Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the property(s)
in the event of such default.

23.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located at
32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah; 118 North 1st West, Tooele, Utah; and 98 North 4th
5

Street, Tooele, Utah. The Quit Claim Deed will be executed within a reasonable time and
no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
The personal property of the parties will be awarded as previously divided by the parties
with the following exceptions:
a.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded his camper free from any claim of interest by the
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon.

b.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the RC Wiley couch, chair and stool, free
from any claim of interest by the Petitioner and subject to any and all liability
thereon.

c.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all property that he has stored at any of
the rental units awarded to Respondent and is hereby ordered to remove said
property within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in
this matter.

d.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all tools or other personal belongings
that he has in the marital home's garage. Specifically, the Petitioner's two chain
saws, miter box and any other tools belonging to Petitioner if said tools are still in
Respondent's possession.

e.

The Respondent is hereby awarded her 30 aught 6 and Petitioner is hereby
ordered to return the gun if the gun is still in Petitioner's possession.

6

f.

The Respondent is awarded the one set cabinets that is remaining in the marital
home. The remaining cabinets are in the possession of the Petitioner and are
hereby awarded to Petitioner.

g.

Petitioner is hereby awarded his motorcyclefreefromany claim of interest by the
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon.

h.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to provide the home videos of the minor child
to the Petitioner to the Petitioner in a timely and reasonable manner for purposes
of Petitioner making copies of the home videos or in the alternative, the
Respondent can provide a copy of the home videos to the Petitioner in a
reasonable and timely manner.

i.

The Petitioner is awarded all of his mother's furniture including the rocking chair,
wash stand, china and silverware, couch and end tables.

j.

The Petitioner is awarded his grandfather's stop watch if in the possession of the
Respondent.

k.

The Petitioner is awarded his father's coins.

1.

The Petitioner is awarded his godfather's dishes and pictures which are to be kept
for the minor child, Caitlin.

25.

The Respondent is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of any retirement sums that have
accrued in Petitioner's retirement planfromthe date of the parties marriage on June 26,
1983, to the date of the parties separation on January 3,1996. The proceeds of the
retirement policy will be distributed pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(aQDROM) to be prepared by Respondent's counsel.
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26.

The Petitioner is further ordered to maintain health insurance for the minor child,
provided it is reasonably available to him through his place of employment. The parties
will equally divide the costs of any premiums incurred within thirty (30) days of the
receipt thereon.

27.

The parties are each ordered to pay one-half of any non-insured medical expenses
[including deductibles, copayments and medications] incurred on behalf of the minor
child within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon.

28.

The parties will each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all work related day care incurred on
behalf of the minor child, within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon.

29.

The parties are ordered to refrain and restrain from engaging in any acts of disparaging,
harassing, intimidation or contacting one another with the exception that the parties may
contact one another as it relates to the minor child. The parties are fiirther restrained from
discussing the divorce action in the presence of the minor child.

30.

The Petitioner is ordered to pay the marital debts and obligations of the parties, holding
the Respondent harmless thereon, as follows:
a.

Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital debts and
obligations incurred by the parties during their period of marriage on June 25,
1983 through the parties' separation on January 3,1996, which includes the
second mortgage on the property located 32 North 200 West, Tooele Utah.

b.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the dentist bill in the approximate amount
of $262 for the Respondent's mouth guard upon proper verification of said bill by
Respondent and within thirty (30) days upon receipt of said verification.
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31.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the martial debts and
obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983 through
the parties' separation on January 3, 1996, which includes the second mortgage on the
property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah.

32.

Any debts incurred by the parties, individually, since the parties separation on January 3,
1996, is awarded to them individually, free from any liability by the other party.

33.

The parties will cooperate in notifying creditors and pay their one-half of said marital
debts and obligations in a timely and efficient manner.

34.

Respondent is awarded the tax exemption on the minor child as long as Respondent is
receiving disability insurance on behalf of the minor child. In the event that Respondent
no longer receives disability insurance on behalf of the minor child, and the issue of child
support is readdressed by the Court, the issue of the award of the tax exemption can be
revisited by the Court.

35.

The parties are ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents necessary
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.

36.

Each of the parties are ordered to bear their own attorney's fees and costs up to the time
of entry of the Stipulation on June 11,1997. The Petitioner is awarded attorney's fees in
the sum of $ ypP

for defending against Respondent's Objection to

Proposed Findings and Decree.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, Patricia M. Collins are mutually awarded
a Decree of Divorce from one another on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and
9
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the same should become final upon signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of
the minor child.
Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded primary physical custody of the
minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be with the Respondent.
Pursuant to the Court's letter of September 8, 1997, in regards to Respondent's objection
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, the
Court hereby orders that each of the parties is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital
debts and obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983
through the parties' separation on January 3,1996 which includes the second mortgage
on the property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah.
The oral Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and Property Settlement was
entered by the Court on June 11, 1997 and more fully recited in the foregoing Findings of
Fact concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support, payment
of the debts and obligations of the parties and any other matters as more specifically set
forth above should be ratified, approved, and confirmed in all particulars, and the same
should be embodied into the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That judgment be ordered accordingly.
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DATED this Jf9 day of V cjhol)*/

, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

JOjMORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TO THE RESPONDENT AND HIS COUNSEL, D. BRUCE OLIVER:
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration
of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by the Petitioner shall
be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date
of the service of this notice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this £1 day of October, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the
following:
D. Bruce Oliver, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303
WENDY J. LEMS, #7409
MOONEY LAW FIRM, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
ROBERT D. COLLINS,

:
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.

:
:

PATRICIA M. COLLINS,

Respondent.

:
:

Case No. 964300201

:

Judge: Hon. John A. Rokich

—oooOooo—
This matter having been submitted to the Honorable John A. Rokich, of the aboveentitled Court, on the 11th day of June, 1997, upon stipulation of the parties, and in accordance
with Utah Code Ann.,§30-3-4 (Supp., 1995), and Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent,
Patricia M. Collins, having entered into a Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and
Property Settlement with the Court on June 11, 1997 before the Honorable John A. Rokich,
whereon the parties consented to the Entry of the Decree of Divorce, consented that pleadings
should be withdrawn and the Court having heard testimony from the parties regarding the
parties' residency, marriage date, grounds and their request that a mutual Decree of Divorce be
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entered pursuant to the terms of the parties' Stipulation, and the Court having determined that
more than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and the
Court having determined that the parties have either completed the divorce counseling or have
listened to the tape regarding the divorce counseling requirement, and the Court having reviewed
the records and files herein and being fully advised of the premises, and the Court having made
and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon stipulation of
the parties and motion of Wendy J. Lems of Mooney Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for Petitioner;
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

The Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and the Respondent, Patricia M. Collins, are hereby
awarded a Decree of Divorce from one another upon the grounds of irreconcilable
differences, and the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent be and the same is
hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby freed and absolutely released from the bonds
of matrimony and all the obligations thereof for said Decree to become final upon signing
and entry of this Decree of Divorce.

2.

Petitioner and Respondent are hereby awarded joint legal custody of the minor child, to
wit: Caitlin Collins, born August 24, 1989, with primary physical custody of the child
awarded to the Respondent.

3.

That the Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay zero (0) dollars in child support to the
Respondent as long as the Respondent is receiving social security disability benefits on
behalf of the minor child. In the event that the Respondent does not receive social
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security disability income benefits on behalf of the minor child, the matter of the
obligation and payment of child support may be revisited with the Court.
The Petitioner is awarded unsupervised visitation with the minor child pursuant to the
Utah Standard Visitation Guidelines §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. (Supp., 1996).
The Petitioner will elect Wednesdays as his mid-week visitation day from 5:30 p.m. until
8:30 p.m., pursuant to the Guidelines, unless the parties can mutually agree otherwise.
The Petitioner is hereby ordered to abstain from the use of any alcohol prior to visitation
with the minor child or at any time during visitation with the minor child. In the event
that the Respondent reasonably believes that the Petitioner has been drinking alcohol,
visitation with the minor child will be suspended for that visitation period only.
The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month in alimony to the
Respondent for a period often (10) years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce by
the Court. Upon the expiration of the ten (10) year period, in the year 2007, the matter of
the payment of alimony will terminate and may be revisited by the Respondent through
an appropriate motion to the Court.
Alimony in this matter will terminate prior to the year 2007 in the event that Respondent
remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite sex.
The Petitioner is hereby awarded the property located at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah.
The Petitioner will assume any and all liability of the 280 West Vine property and will be
entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property, and will hold the Respondent
harmless thereon. The Respondent is entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said
property for the principal amount due in the event that Petitioner defaults on any of the
3

debt or liability of said property. In the event of such default, Respondent is entitled to
foreclose her lien on the property.
10.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located
at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah in favor of Petitioner within a reasonable time and no
later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter.

11.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the marital home located at 32 North 200 West,
Tooele, Utah. The Respondent will assume any and all liability on said property, holding
the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner is entitled to an immediate judgment lien
on said property for the principal amount due in the event that Respondent defaults on
any of the debt or liability of said property. In the event of such default, Petitioner is
entitled to foreclose his lien on the property.

12.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the rental properties located at 118 North 1st West,
Tooele, Utah and 98 North 4th Street, Tooele, Utah, and will be entitled to any and all
rents or proceeds from said property. The Respondent will assume any and all liability
on said property, holding the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner is entitled to an
immediate judgment lien on said property for the principal amount due in the event that
Respondent defaults on any of the debt or liability of said property(s). In the event of
such default, Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his lien on the property(s).

13.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located at
32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah; 118 North 1st West, Tooele, Utah; and 98 North 4th
Street, Tooele, Utah. The Quit Claim Deed will be executed within a reasonable time and
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no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
The personal property of the parties will be awarded as previously divided by the parties
with the following exceptions:
a.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded his camper free from any claim of interest by the
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon.

b.

The Respondent is hereby awarded the RC Wiley couch, chair and stool, free
from any claim of interest by the Petitioner and subject to any and all liability
thereon.

c.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all property that he has stored at any of
the rental units and is hereby ordered to remove said property within thirty (30)
days of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter.

d.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all tools or other personal belongings
that he has at the marital home or in the marital home's garage. Specifically, the
Petitioner's two chain saws and miter box and any other tools belonging to
Petitioner.

e.

The Respondent is hereby awarded her 30 aught 6 and Petitioner is hereby
ordered to return the gun if the gun is still in Petitioner's possession.

f.

The Respondent is awarded one set of cabinets that is remaining in the marital
home. The remaining cabinets are in the possession of the Petitioner and are
hereby awarded to Petitioner.
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g.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded his motorcycle free from any claim of interest
by the Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon.

h.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to provide the home videos of the minor child
to the Petitioner in a timely and reasonable manner for purposes of Petitioner
making copies of the home videos or in the alternative, the Respondent can
provide a copy of the home videos to the Petitioner in a reasonable and timely
manner.

i.

The Petitioner is awarded all of his mother's furniture including but not limited to
the rocking chair, washstand, china and silverware, couch and end tables.

j.

The Petitioner is awarded his grandfather's stop watch if in the possession of the
Respondent.

k.

The Petitioner is awarded his father's coins.

1.

The Petitioner is awarded his godfather's dishes and pictures which are to be kept
for the minor child, Caitlin.

The Respondent is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of any retirement sums that have
accrued in Petitioner's retirement plan from the date of the parties' marriage on June 26,
1983, to the date of the parties' separation on January 3, 1996. The proceeds of the
retirement policy will be distributed pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
("QDRO") to be prepared by Respondent's counsel.
The Petitioner is further ordered to maintain health insurance for the minor child,
provided it is reasonably available to him through his place of employment. The parties
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will equally divide the costs of any premiums incurred within thirty (30) days of the
receipt thereon.
17.

The parties are each ordered to pay one-half of any non-insured medical expenses
[including deductibles, copayments and medications] incurred on behalf of the minor
child within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon.

18.

The parties will each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all work related day care incurred on
behalf of the minor child, within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon.

19.

The parties are ordered to refrain and restrain from engaging in any acts of disparaging,
harassing, intimidation or contacting one another with the exception that the parties may
contact one another as it relates to the minor child. The parties are further restrained from
discussing the divorce action in the presence of the minor child.

20.

The Petitioner is ordered to pay the marital debts and obligations of the parties, holding
the Respondent harmless thereon, as follows:
a.

Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the remaining marital debts
and obligations incurred by the parties during their period of marriage on June 25,
1983 through the parties' separation on January 3, 1996, which includes the
second mortgage on the property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah.

b.

The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the Respondent's dentist bill in the
approximate amount of $262 for the Respondent's mouth guard, within thirty (30)
days of receipt thereof upon proper verification of said bill by Respondent.

21.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the remaining martial debts
and obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983
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through the parties' separation on January 3, 1996, which includes the second mortgage
on the property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah.
22.

Any debts incurred by the parties, individually, since the parties separation on January 3,
1996, is awarded to them individually, free from any liability by the other party.

23.

The parties will cooperate in notifying creditors and pay their one-half of said marital
debts and obligations in a timely and efficient manner.

24.

Respondent is awarded the tax exemption on the minor child as long as Respondent is
receiving disability insurance on behalf of the minor child. In the event that Respondent
no longer receives disability insurance on behalf of the minor child, and the issue of child
support is readdressed by the Court, the issue of the award of the tax exemption can be
revisited by the Court.

25.

The parties are ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents necessary
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.

26.

Each of the parties are ordered to bear their own attorney's fees and costs up to the time
of entry of the Stipulation on June 11, 1997. The Petitioner is awarded attorney's fees in
the sum of $

y^Oc) -

for

defending against Respondent's Objection to

Proposed Findings and Decree.
DATED this off

day of 0 ^ 0 k*S^

, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
Third District Court Judge
8

jooavi

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TO THE RESPONDENT AND HIS COUNSEL, D. BRUCE OLIVER:
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration
of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by the Petitioner shall
be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date
of the service of this notice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this <??? day of October, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following:
D. Bruce Oliver, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
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